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here is a film currently showing in New York called “The Clock”, which was recently 
awarded the grand prize at the Biennale in Venice. The film runs for a full 24 hours 
and is made with carefully pieced-together excerpts of Hollywood movies that are 
related to each particular time of the day. I have not yet seen it, but it seems that the most 
topical and exciting moments are in the minutes just before midnight. This puts me in mind 
of the European Union.   
There is little doubt that the performance of the EU is rated very poorly by most observers, 
both within and outside Europe. Some of these judgements are biased or uninformed, but it 
would be a mistake to deny that many are often well-founded. I am convinced that in many 
cases the source of the problem is the perceivable gap between the EU’s declared objectives 
and its practical achievements. For committed and unrepentant federalists like me, this is 
cause for regret, for others it is simply proof that the whole idea was fundamentally flawed 
from the start. A gap between expectations and achievements is inherent in all political 
systems, but why is it so important in the case of the EU? 
One explanation may be found in the very nature of the process. As was clearly and 
unequivocally stated in the (in)famous decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court 
(BVG) on the Lisbon Treaty, the legitimacy of the Union has always stood, and still stands, 
exclusively on the member states and their democratic institutions. This has been 
misleadingly termed the ‘democratic deficit’. The inevitable consequence of this principle is 
that member states naturally weight their national interests against the declared common 
goal. As a result, they are only prepared to accept what is necessary at any given moment in 
order to preserve the integrity of the system and the degree of integration that has been 
achieved. In other words, the process is not dominated by what is desirable (however 
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defined), but by what is necessary. Very often the necessity of a decision is determined by 
outside pressure and occurs ‘ten minutes before midnight’. If judged against this benchmark, 
the system has not performed badly for most of its six decade long history. Furthermore, it 
has created a process that is analogous to riding a bicycle whereby each turn of the wheel 
leads to the necessity of the next. In this sense European integration is by definition a ‘work 
in progress’. This is the reason I have been sceptical about all past attempts to draft a 
‘European constitution’. This state of affairs is inevitably a source of disappointment for 
those who support integration and it baffles foreign observers who conclude that the EU 
lacks a sense of strategic direction. 
In all political systems there is a gap between the rhetoric of electoral programmes and the 
practical work of institutions, but the ‘vision thing’ is often a necessary prerequisite to 
reaching difficult decisions. When it comes to European institutions, which incidentally 
include the member states acting collectively, the desirable vision – the goal of European 
unity – has always been there and is still very much alive, including in Germany. Also, the 
existence of a broadly defined political goal has often facilitated agreements that were in fact 
purely necessary. However, because we lack a pan-European constituency to debate it, the 
narrative about this goal has been translated into different languages and is all but common. 
In fact, we have never seriously tried to unify it. Indeed, Europeans stopped debating what is 
desirable a long time ago: they simply react to events. As Jacques Chirac said after the failure 
of Nice, “les héros sont fatigués”. 
Nevertheless, there have been occasions on which decisions have gone beyond what was 
strictly necessary and were driven by broader political motives. I would call them defining 
moments. They were moments in history when a combination of personal leadership and 
favourable circumstances allowed Europe to do the desirable rather than only the necessary 
thing. I can count four of them. The first was the very start of the process: the creation of the 
Coal and Steel Community. The necessity was to allow Germany to rebuild its heavy 
industry. There would have been other, less ambitious ways to do it; indeed they were 
actively pursued in the years before the Schuman plan. Monnet was able to exploit that 
particular issue in the pursuit of a political agenda (Franco-German reconciliation) and 
devise a revolutionary solution to a relatively simple problem. The revolution consisted of 
introducing the concept of limited transfers of sovereignty to common institutions. An 
inevitable (incurable?) tension was thus introduced between the supranational nature of the 
process and the exclusive legitimacy of the member states. 
The second such moment was the Treaty of Rome. The necessity was to promote more 
market integration within Europe. It could have been pursued by less ambitious means, for 
instance a free trade zone of the type advocated by the UK. The founding members decided 
instead to apply the same method as had been successfully applied to coal and steel. 
The third was the single market programme of Jacques Delors and the related institutional 
reform embodied in the Single Act. To increase the integration of markets beyond the 
customs union had been an enduring objective for many years: it could have been pursued 
with the existing means, tackling (albeit slowly) the problems one by one. The decision was 
made to embark on an ambitious comprehensive programme and to abandon in part the 
sacred principle of unanimity. 
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The fourth defining moment was, of course, the euro. The degree of market integration that 
had been achieved risked being undermined by monetary instability within Europe. Many at 
that time thought that more stability could have been obtained by less radical means. It was 
instead decided to pool one of the most important elements of national sovereignty: 
monetary policy. The common feature of these defining moments was that they all led to a 
strengthening of the supranational nature of the system, but carefully avoided confronting 
the issue of legitimacy. 
There have been other moments that could have been defining, but the opportunity was 
missed. During the cold war a European army under the control of a political authority 
would have been desirable, and the project of a European Defence Community went very far 
before it was defeated in the French Parliament. Europe opted instead for what was 
necessary: to create the conditions to allow Germany to rearm within NATO against the 
Soviet threat. Also, the various enlargements, particularly the last one, could have provided 
the opportunity to redefine the structure of the Union. It was decided, however, from 
Amsterdam to Nice and to Lisbon, to stick to only what was strictly necessary. 
Are the current challenges now facing the EU any different from those of the past? Yes and 
no. Many analysts, both in Europe and abroad, think that monetary union can only function 
if it is accompanied by some form of (still undefined) ‘fiscal union’ and that in order to 
correct the fault lines that have emerged in the architecture of the Maastricht Treaty, we need 
far- reaching reform. On the other hand, member states are clearly not prepared to face a 
new defining moment. The decision of the BVG mentioned above is clear on this point: no 
more transfers of sovereignty without.... without what? Apparently, without a solution to the 
problem of legitimacy, which in the minds of those German lawyers is so radical as to be 
politically impossible. Its main fault is that it denies in the most absolute terms even the 
potential existence of an embryonic European legitimacy, elements of which have in reality 
emerged from the bottom-up approach initiated by Jean Monnet. In so doing, it challenges 
the very evolutionary nature of the construction in Europe. I have termed it “democratic 
fundamentalism”. The problem with that decision is that it concerns a country that is not 
only the most important, but also one whose political culture is uniquely attached to the 
‘sanctity of law’ and suspicious of political discretion. Since its message now blends with 
weak leadership and rampant populism, the overall result is that the capacity of the German 
government to act is seriously compromised.  
For the past year member states have concentrated their efforts on what they think is 
necessary to avoid a crisis of the euro. In fact, conditioned as they are by pressing domestic 
concerns and by the rise of populist movements in practically all countries, they have shown 
an increasing tendency to confuse what is necessary with what is sellable to their domestic 
constituencies. As a result, instead of a single comprehensive response, we have seen a series 
of successive steps taken at very short notice in response to events dictated by the markets. It 
is as if, while the gap between necessary and desirable tends to narrow, the one between 
necessary and possible tends to widen. Thus, the tension between the need for common 
action and the exclusive legitimacy of each nation is becoming more acute at the very 
moment domestic pressures make progress more difficult. On the other hand, the 
preservation of what has been achieved has become a vital necessity, not only for each and 
every member state, but also for the global economy. In this sense the euro has created a new 
paradigm. The implication of the principle that all power entrusted to the European 
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institutions is delegated to them by the member states is that they should have the legitimate 
right to withdraw it. With the euro there is no going back without facing the prospect of a 
systemic earthquake. The term necessary has acquired a totally new meaning.  
Some believe that the pragmatic steps that have been taken so far amount to a new defining 
moment. That remains to be seen and the markets still look unconvinced. The practice of 
responding to events ‘ten minutes before midnight’, while hoping that in retrospect it will 
appear to have produced major reform may not work indefinitely. Others believe that sheer 
necessity will force member states all the way down to full ‘fiscal union’ with a single 
European Finance Minister empowered, among other things, to issue eurobonds. That is also 
an open question. The whole issue turns around two hurdles: how to share the costs and the 
new delegation of power to the supranational institutions. While the first is painful but real, 
and therefore manageable, the second is ideological and therefore intractable. The resulting 
paradox is that, for ideological reasons, we are imposing on the sovereignty of national 
parliaments constraints that are bigger than those that would be necessary in the presence of 
more ‘federal’ instruments. 
We are also facing another challenge: the desire of the rest of the world to see ‘more Europe’ 
in the effort to shape a new international system. It would certainly be desirable for Europe 
to speak (and act) as one unit on the global scene. Unfortunately, here we seem to be failing 
to do even what is necessary: to respond effectively to the transformation that is taking place 
on our southern borders. We should be aware that, in this case, external pressures are much 
weaker: the world will regret Europe’s absence, but it can look after itself even without us. 
This leaves us with a final question: if and when we arrive at a new defining moment, shall 
we still be ‘all together’? In response to those who criticised the Single Act for being too 
modest, Jacques Delors replied that it was the price to pay for keeping everyone on board. 
Without saying so, he was pointing at the UK. The euro has already led us to derogate to that 
principle, in the belief that membership of the Union but not of the eurozone was sustainable 
in the long term. The accumulation of steps that have been taken to respond to the crisis of 
the eurozone could challenge that assumption. In other words, if necessity and desirability 
can be made to meet again, should we miss the opportunity for the sake of being ‘all 
together’? 
